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Crying "Foul" on Foul Language on the Picket Line:
The Anomalous Displacement of Nonstrikers' Right to
Sue
Carol D. Rasnic
It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three un-
speakably precious things: Freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and
the prudence never to practice either of them. (MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING
THE EQUATOR, 1897, heading of ch. 20).
Harsh and intemperate language of striking union members di-
rected toward nonstriking workers can be defamatory, emotionally
damaging or even an instant inducement for retaliatory actions. To
what extent should striking workers be able to besmear their
replacements, with impunity from liability? It is indeed axiomatic
that picket line activity will not generally be characterized by ami-
cability and courtesy. A labor dispute which results in a strike
often is the end product of acrimony and hostility between parties
with diametrically opposed interests, and the union's decision to
declare a work stoppage usually is made with the resolute determi-
nation to attain its announced goal-whether higher wages or im-
proved working conditions. Consequently, the underlying animos-
ity sets the stage for inevitable verbal abuse, if not outright
violence.
Since 1935, the Congress has recognized the right of labor orga-
nizations to engage in strike activity in response to disputes with
an employer over wages, hours or terms and conditions of employ-
ment.1 In 1947, the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter
Taft-Hartley) was amended by the addition of the so-called "free-
dom of speech" provision, section 8(c),2 which provides that the
expression of opinion shall not be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice, provided there is no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.
Verbal chastisement of nonstriking workers by strikers can give
rise to common law slander actions or suits for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Too, many state legislatures have en-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
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acted "fighting words" statutes3 which allow recovery to an indi-
vidual who is the target of words so insulting as to be expected to
provoke a reasonable person to engage in a breach of the peace.
When picketers' rights to employ constitutionally or statutorily
protected speech in a labor context collide with nonstrikers' com-
mon law slander and state statutory "fighting words" rights, the
appropriate balance is one with which the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (hereinafter NLRB or Board) and the courts, both
federal and state, must grapple. Because of the possible discourag-
ing effect on continued work efforts of nonstrikers when subjected
to vituperative language from those on strike, management, too,
clearly has a vested interest in the protection of the legal rights of
strikers' replacements.
I. PICKETERS' CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Picketing has been recognized as within the area of constitution-
ally protected free speech under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments since 1940, when the United States Supreme Court held in
Thornhill v. Alabama4 that an Alabama statute which prohibited
all picketing, whether or not violent in nature, was invalid on four-
teenth amendment grounds. The Court in Thornhill did, however,
acknowledge the interest of a state to "take adequate steps to pre-
serve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the prop-
erty of its residents." 5 Indeed, injunctions of picketing activity by
state courts have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court
when the purposes were to compel a business to cease selling its
product to self-employed distributors in violation of a state anti-
trust law,6 to force a racial quota in the hiring of workers,7 to com-
pel persons who are self-employed to observe union working
hours,8 and to force an employer in a right-to-work state to employ
union labor.9
It is significant that the invoking of first and fourteenth amend-
ment protections is limited to infringements on one's freedom of
3. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (1977).
4. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
5. Id. at 105.
6. Givoney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1950).
7. Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
8. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).




speech by the government, respectively, the federal and state gov-
ernments.1" Consequently, picketing restricted to private property
is not constitutionally protected activity, and strikers located on
their employer's property must accede to his own right to prohibit
trespassing. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 1 the Supreme Court
held that private property picketing must involve an accommoda-
tion and a balancing of the property rights of the employer with
the statutory rights of the picketers under section 7 of Taft-Hart-
ley, 2 and that a union might obtain entrance upon such premises
when the owner has forbidden it to enter only if there is no other
access to persons with whom the union is attempting to communi-
cate, and then only to the extent necessary." This section 7 right
to engage in "concerted activity for mutual aid and benefit" was
strengthened by the addition of the section 8(c) "free speech" pro-
vision, and this section provides the usual basis for justification of
abusive picket line language, whether spoken or displayed on
picket signs.
II. NON-UNION REPLACEMENTS' COUNTERVAILING RIGHTS
Efforts to enjoin picket activity generally are initiated by the
employer. The protagonists and their conflicting rights become
more numerous when he responds to a union's work stoppage by
hiring nonstriking replacements. This right of an employer perma-
nently to replace economic strikers has been recognized since 1938,
when the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele-
graph Co. 4 that such replaced strikers were not entitled to rein-
statement after the conclusion of the strike. Even strikes not eco-
nomic in nature might give rise to a justified discharge of a striker
who engages in illegal acts during the labor dispute. 5 This threat
of the ultimate loss of the striker's job typically is no serious deter-
rent to abusive language directed toward the replacements who are
realistically diminishing the impact of the union's efforts toward
resolving the dispute in its favor. The purpose of the strike, to put
10. These two constitutional amendments prohibit the Congress and the states from
infringing upon one's right of free speech.
11. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157, which gives employees the right to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
13. It should be mentioned that the picketing in Babcock & Wilcox was organizational
in nature, rather than the informational picketing which usually accompanies a strike.
14. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
15. See, e.g., Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1976).
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the employer at an economic disadvantage, has thereby been
aborted, and its effect might appear minimized.
A. Possible Unfair Labor Practice Charge by Nonstriking
Employee
Any action by the union which is coercive or restraining is an
unfair labor practice which the NLRB might order must cease and
desist.16 Thus, attempts physically to prevent a replacement from
working are prohibited, since section 7 assures employees not only
the right to engage in union activity, but also the right to refrain
from such activity.17 Unlawful coercion or restraint includes not
only actual violence, but also threats of violence.18 The Board for-
merly held that, in order for language to constitute such a "threat"
as would deprive a striker from the statutory protection in section
8(c), there must be accompanying physical acts or gestures to add
emphasis to the words.' 9 This strict rule that words per se can
never amount to unlawful coercion or restraint was abandoned by
the Board in Clear Pine Mouldings,20 when a more liberal con-
struction of "threat" was adopted. The Board quoted from the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in Associated Grocers v. New Eng-
land,21 which held that "[a] serious threat may draw its credibility
from the surrounding circumstances and not from the physical ges-
tures of the speaker. 22 The Clear Pine Mouldings Board adopted
the earlier test of the Third Circuit23 in NLRB v. W.C. Mc-
Quaide, 4 where it was held that language would constitute illegal
coercion or restraint if the "misconduct is such that, under the cir-
cumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate
employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act."'2 5 The
strikers in Clear Pine Mouldings who were held to have relin-
quished their rights under the statute had carried a two-foot long
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (as amended 1947).
18. See, e.g., Perry Norvell Co., 80 NLRB 225 (1948).
19. Coronet Casuals, 207 NLRB 304, 305 (1973).
20. 268 NLRB No. 173 (1984).
21. 562 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1977).
22. Id. at 1336.
23. The somewhat unique relationship between the Board and the courts should be
clarified. The Board, although bound by Supreme Court interpretations of the statute, is
bound by a circuit court of appeals decision only in the case at bar. That is, the Board
subsequently might continue to interpret Taft-Hartley differently from a circuit court of
appeals' decision. See B. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 28 (Reston Pub. 1983).
24. 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977), denying enforcement in part to 220 NLRB 593 (1975).
25. 552 F.2d at 527.
Vol. 25:457
Picket Line Language
club with which they swung at replacements and beat on vehicles
belonging to nonstriking employees, carried tire irons, baseball
bats and ax handles, and were accompanied by dogs. Although
there was no actual attendant physical injury or property damage,
this conduct was regarded by the Board as being "inherently coer-
cive and intimidating,"" as was the strikers' verbal threat to kill a
nonstriking employee. Another picketer held to have been guilty of
coercion and restraint had advised a nonstriker that she was "tak-
ing her life in her own hands by crossing the picket line and would
live to regret it"2 7 and had threatened to burn the house of another
nonstriker. He had also told another employee that the hands of
one of her colleagues "would be broken. ' 28 Recognizing that the
presence of physical gestures which accompany verbal threats may
in fact increase the severity of verbal conduct, the Board held that
the absence of such gestures will not necessarily negate the coer-
cive effect of the language. 9
Despite the express rejection by the Clear Pine Mouldings
Board of the previous rule that words per se can never constitute
coercion or restraint, there remains the requirement that the lan-
guage contain an element of threat. The mere calling nonstrikers
obscene and profane names, without the accompanying threat of
impending personal harm or property damage, is protected speech
under section 8(c).30 Similarly, namecalling amounting to racial
slurs is not coercive.31
There evidently is a greater tendency of the courts to find such
misconduct on the part of strikers by reason of their language to
nonstrikers as will justify a denial of reinstatement than there is
for the Board to hold that such conduct is tantamount to coercion.
Picketers' profane and insulting language directed toward persons
attempting to work was held by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co. 32 to have denied them
reinstatement rights.
26. 268 NLRB No. 173, 1983-CCH NLRB 16,083, at 27, 419.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 27,417.
30. See Longshoreman's & Warehouseman's Union (CIO), 79 NLRB 1487 (1948) and
Perry Norvell Co., 80 NLRB 225 (1948).
31. See Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union Local 466, 191
NLRB No. 81 (1971). Here, the strikers referred to nonstrikers as "Uncle Toms" and
"dagos."
32. 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953).
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B. Nonstriking Employees' Possible State Court Rights of
Action
Unlike the aggressive connotation in Taft-Hartley's "coercion"
and "restraint" which will constitute illegal speech, the common
law torts of defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress
require no proof of physical harm or property damage, or fear of
such. Implicit in an allegation of slander, the verbal form of defa-
mation, is damage to one's reputation and the obvious requirement
that the utterance, in order to be actionable, be communicated
("published") to a third person. Further, in order for a statement
to be defamatory, it must be one which a reasonable person would
tend to believe as factual. Absent either of these two elements,
there could be no conceivable loss of reputation. Frequently, a
plaintiff will file a lawsuit and seek monetary damages by reason of
the simultaneous commission of both torts by a single statement or
publication. A recent example of a plaintiff's successful suit on one
theory and failure to prove the other is Falwell v. Flynt,33 in which
the well-known Virginia clergyman filed suit against the magazine
and its publisher, which had printed a statement to the effect that
the plaintiff had engaged in sexual relations with his mother and
had consistently and purposely become drunk prior to preaching
sermons. The jury awarded him $100,000.00 in actual damages and
$50,000.00 in punitive damages against Flynt, the individual de-
fendant, and $50,000.00 in punitive damages against Hustler, the
corporate defendant, by reason of his resulting emotional distress,
but denied his recovery on the libel charge, since the finding was
that no reasonable man would believe that the parody was a
description of actual facts about the plaintiff."'
In addition to the possibility of a slander or mental distress ac-
tion filed by a nonstriking employee against a picketer and/or his
union, many states have statutes making illegal those words which
directly tend to induce acts of violence by those to whom they are
addressed. The landmark case upholding the constitutionality of
such a statute is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,6 in which the
United States Supreme Court held valid a New Hampshire law pe-
nalizing "offensive, derisive and annoying words."36 The New
33. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 1273. The publication was an advertisement for Campari liqueur, footnoted
by the defendant as a "parody," which portrayed Falwell as a "hypocrite and habitual
drunkard," and his mother as a "drunken and immoral woman." Id. at 1272.
35. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
36. Id. at 573.
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Hampshire Supreme Court had construed the statute to apply only
to those words which "have a direct tendency to cause acts of vio-
lence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is ad-
dressed."' (The underlying rationale for such legislation is the en-
couragement of persons to endure provocative language and to
refrain from actual physical retaliation, exercising instead the stat-
utory right to seek damages. Presumably the idea originated dur-
ing the era when dueling as a method of dispute settlement was
prevalent.3 8) The inducement-to-violence characteristic provided
the basis for the state's interest in preventing such language.
States in which the highest courts had not limited the application
of such statutes to true "fighting words," but included by implica-
tion also words which were merely insulting, did not fare so well as
had New Hampshire and were struck down by the Supreme Court
as overly broad and vague.39 The range of perceivable theories for
state lawsuits a nonstriking employee might file against a verbally
abusive picketer, then, contains three causes of action: slander, in-
tentional infliction of mental distress and violation of a state's
"fighting words" statute.
The most patent impediment to any such right of action is a
court's position that federal law preempts state jurisdiction. Con-
gress' having provided comprehensive legislation applicable to dis-
putes arising out of the labor relationship, the United States Su-
preme Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon0 that state intrusion in the field is preempted absent a
compelling state interest. The reasoning of the Garmon Court was
the "primary jurisdiction of the Board" view"' that the federal gov-
ernment's interest in enforcing its labor policy must be balanced
against a state's interest in regulating matters traditionally left to
state jurisdiction. Another school of judicial thought favoring pre-
emption developed in Lodge 76, International Association of Ma-
chinists v. Wisconsin Employment Commission,2 in which the
Court held that a state law cause of action that interferes with the
economic weapon intended by Taft-Hartley to be left free clearly is
37. Id.
38. See Crawford v. United Steelworkers, infra note 68, 335 S.E.2d at 840-41
(Cochran, J,, concurring), describing the "fighting words" statute as a "useless apendage to
the common law, an obsolete vestige of the proclivity for dueling."
39. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974)..
40. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
41. Id. at 245.
42. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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a frustration to the federal labor relations system,43 this latter view
indicating a more inflexible application of the preemption doctrine
than that expressed in Garmon. Indeed, the Court has limited the
applicability of Garmon to those factual situations which were "ar-
guably-but not definitely-prohibited or protected"' by Taft-
Hartley. In other words, under this theory, unless one attempting
to file suit in a state court had rights which were at least "argua-
bly" redressable under Taft-Hartley, they were not preempted.
This view assures a plaintiff a forum for his action, if the Board
cannot possibly afford him relief. It is instructive to look chrono-
logically at the preemption doctrine in the field of labor-manage-
ment relations and how it has been applied by the courts to law-
suits based upon the three legal theories.
In spite of the Garmon Court's express allowance for the states
to "grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the
traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and immi-
nent threats to the public order,""' Taft-Hartley has nonetheless
frequently been held to preempt the states in these very areas. The
Supreme Court itself has not been consistent in its treatment of
whether state courts are preempted from dealing with picket line
vulgar and intimidating language. In Youngdahl v. Rainfair,8 al-
though the portion of an Arkansas state court's injunction of all
picketing, including that peaceful in nature, was reversed as an im-
permissible intrusion into preempted activity, the state court's in-
junction of those acts reasonably likely to provoke violence was af-
firmed. Citing Chaplinsky, the Court found a state interest in
enjoining recognitional picketing combined with continuous
ridiculing and annoying language, the effect of which would "cease
to be persuasion and become intimidation and incitement to vio-
lence."'17 The state court was considered to be in a better position
to assess the local situation as to whether violence would likely re-
sult. Actions enjoined included masses of strikers congregating
along the edge of the employer's lot, engaging in singing humiliat-
ing songs at workers, sticking out their tongues and making ob-
scene gestures, shouting such names as "fat scab," "cotton pickin'
fools" and "cotton patch scabs" (some directed toward individual
43. Id. at 144.
44. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978).
45. 359 U.S. at 247.
46. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
47. Id. at 138.
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workers). 8 Picketers also yelled insulting remarks toward one
pregnant worker ("Get the hot water ready")49 and derided one
worker's clothing and "low-cut dresses and earrings.
'50
It is perhaps significant that the approved state court action in
Youngdahl was injunctive and, as such, was deemed to prevent fu-
ture violence. Preemption appears to be more readily applied when
the action is one at law where a worker is seeking damages for
strikers' past verbal abuse. In Letter Carriers v. Austin,51 a Vir-
ginia state court award of damages to a non-union employee who
had sued the union for libel was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The union had placed the plaintiff's name on a published "List of
Scabs" in a circulated newsletter, accompanied by a definition of
"scab. '52 The Supreme Court held this not to be actionable as de-
famatory under state law because such would "undermin[e] the
freedom of speech which long has been a tenet of federal labor pol-
icy" 53 in which Congress and the Board had expressly authorized
the "freewheeling use of the written and spoken word. . . favoring
uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate in labor disputes." 54
A somewhat contradictory opinion had preceded Letter Carriers
by some eight years, Linn v. Plant Guardworkers,5 5 in which the
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' holdings that federal law
48. Id. at 134.
49. Id. at 135.
50. Id.
51. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
52. The definition of "scab" printed in the newsletter was as follows:
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some aw-
ful substance left with which He made a scab.
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination
backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carriers a tumor of rotten
principles.
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in
Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out. No man (or woman)
has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to drown his carcass, or a rope
long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab. For
betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself. A scab has not.
Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Saviour for thirty pieces
of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of a commission in the Brit-
ish Army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fel-
lowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer.
Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a
traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his
class!
Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 268 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 270.
54. Id. at 272-73.
55. 388 U.S. 53 (1966).
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preempted a non-union employee's libel action. During an organi-
zational campaign, the defendant union had circulated a pamphlet
accusing the plaintiff and other employees of depriving employees
of their right to vote in a union election, robbing employees of pay
increases and lying to employees. The plaintiff's libel suit for
$1,000,000 was regarded by the Court as stating a cause of action
despite congressional intent to immunize "vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp verbal attack."5 However, this im-
munity for "the most repulsive speech" is lost, held the Court, if it
is made "with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of
whether it was true or false. ' 57 The Court, by analogy, adopted the
New York Times standard for labor dispute defamation cases.58
The most obvious distinction between Letter Carriers and Linn is
not whether or not the statements were made without regard for
their truth or falsity, but, rather, whether they were such as would
be reasonably perceived as statements of fact. In Linn, the plaintiff
had been accused by the defendant of unambiguously illegal con-
duct which he contended to be false. In Letter Carriers, the plain-
tiff's name was simply attached to a term, presumptively defined
by the defendants in a long, narrative statement which a reader
would likely find unbelievable, if not facetious.
Again, in Farmer v. Carpenters," an action for damages from a
union for having inflicted severe emotional distress by its verbal
onslaughts heaped upon workers, its "frequent public ridicule" and
"incessant verbal abuse," 60 the Supreme Court refused to apply the
preemption doctrine. Reversing the state court's holding that fed-
eral labor law provided the exclusive remedy, the Court character-
ized the plaintiff's allegations as "interests so deeply rooted in lo-
cal feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction . . . [it could not be inferred] that Con-
gress had deprived the states of the power to act."6
It is noteworthy to mention a different cause of action deemed
by the Supreme Court not to be preempted by federal law. In Bel-
knap, Inc. v. Hale,62 a striker's replacement had sued the employer
who, after having hired him on a permanent basis during the
56. Id. at 62, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id. at 65.
59. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
60. Id. at 293.
61. Id. at 296-97, quoting from Garmon, supra note 40.
62. 463 U.S. 492 (1983).
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strike, nonetheless rehired the strikers and dismissed the replace-
ments when the dispute was settled. 3 The Supreme Court agreed
with the Kentucky Court of Appeals that the employer's economic
weapons were not unlimited, since he could not use them to injure
innocent third parties.8 The Court concurred with the state
court's judgment that this conduct of the employer was only of
"peripheral concern" 65 to the NLRB, and involved largely local
feeling subject to the jurisdiction of the state court.6 This holding
has been harshly criticized as requiring the struck employer to con-
dition any employment offer made to replacements during an eco-
nomic strike as possibly temporary in order to avoid having to de-
fend a breach of contract action later, thereby interfering unduly
with Congress' intent for unfettered and orderly procedure in la-
bor-management relations.
6 7
One of the most recent, and surely one of the most protracted,
litigations in a state court involving the preemption issue in picket
line language is Crawford v. United Steelworkers. 8 After the lime
company-employer had obtained a largely ignored state court in-
junction of improper conduct on the picket line, several nonstrik-
ing employees filed a state court action against the union and sev-
eral individual members, seeking both injunctive relief and
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of
the Virginia "fighting words" statute6" and violation of portions of
the Virginia right-to-work legislation. 70 Following a volatile eigh-
teen-month strike which had begun in 1977, the case was finally
tried by a Virginia trial court in May, 1981. Summarily finding no
evidence of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court
dismissed all but one count in the plaintiffs' motion for judg-
63. After an initially economic strike, the employer had unilaterally granted a pay in-
crease for those union employees who had worked during the strike. The resulting § 8(a)(3)
charge was mediated by the Board's Regional Director, and the settlement included dismis-
sal of the unfair labor practice charge by the strikers, their recall by the employer, and
termination of their replacements.
64. 463 U.S. at 500.
65. 110 L.R.R.M. 2377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
66. Id. at 2398.
67. See Comment, Strikebreakers, the Supreme Court and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale: The
Continuing Erosion of Federal Labor Preemption, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 839 (1984).
68. 230 Va. 216, 335 S.E.2d 828 (1985).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (1977).
70. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-53 (1974), 40.1-66 (1970), which forbid the use of force,




ment.7' The lower court held not actionable as a matter of law
under the "fighting words" statute the terms "scab," "scabby,"
"nigger," "bastard" and "son of a bitch." However, the court
agreed with the plaintiff that two words which implied, respec-
tively, incestuous activity by plaintiffs with their mothers and cer-
tain acts of sodomy by plaintiffs, did violate the statute.72 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiffs were awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages
and $10,000 in punitive damages. Both parties appealed, and a
very split (4-3) Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed all but the
damage award, reversing because of its position that any action
based on the "fighting words" statute in a labor dispute context
was preempted by federal law. It is possibly germane that the ob-
jectionable language by the defendants was accompanied by ob-
scene gestures and the pointing by certain union members of a
gun73 toward a vehicle owned by one of the plaintiffs, and, as such,
might constitute coercion and restraint under section 8(b)(1) of
Taft-Hartley.74 There was also testimony that two of the defend-
ants had attempted to run one of the plaintiffs off the road, that
one had threatened him with a hammer 7 and that one had wielded
a burning stick.7a Additionally, this plaintiff testified that there
were nails in his tires after he had crossed the picket line and that
three defendants used threatening language to him.77 Further, one
defendant was said to have brandished a hammer at a worker, tell-
ing him to "Get out of the car and I'll knock your goddam brains
out."
7 8
In denying recovery and holding the state cause of action to have
been preempted, the court distinguished the facts in Crawford
from those in Linn because of its finding that the standards set out
by the Linn Court were not met, and viewed the plaintiffs' reliance
on Linn as "misplaced. 719 Too, even Linn, stated the court, was a
71. Since § 40.1-53 is punishable as a misdemeanor, and § 40.1-66 and -67 provide only
for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' prayer for damages was ruled by the trial court to be
inappropriate and was therefore dismissed. See 335 S.E.2d at 839.
72. Id. at 830, and Common Law Book 18, p.120, Circuit Court of Giles County,
Virginia.
73. 335 S.E.2d at 832.
74. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
75. 335 S.E.2d at 833.
76. Id. at 832.
77. The allegedly threatening language included the following: "We'll get your damn
ass," and "We'll get your black ass." Id. at 833. Another striker yelled that he "hoped that
nigger has good life insurance" Id. at 834.
78. Id. at 835.
79. Id. at 836.
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"partial preemption" in such actions,80 holding that all state libel
actions in a labor context were preempted except for a very narrow
class of cases. Holding Letter Carriers as controlling,81 the court
emphasized the absence of a falsehood, or false statement of fact.
Acknowledging the defendants' words as "disgusting, abusive, re-
pulsive, and . . . in no way condoned by this Court," 2 they none-
theless could not reasonably be understood to convey the false rep-
resentation that the plaintiffs were actually guilty of the despicable
conduct implied in the terms (sodomy or incest).
A forceful dissent viewed Chaplinsky, not Letter Carriers, as ap-
plicable" because the issue in Letter Carriers was that of defama-
tion, not whether the "fighting words" statute had been violated.
Conceding that the defendants' contemptuous epithets would not
be defamatory because not representative of facts,' the minority
opinion took the position that Farmer, decided subsequent to Let-
ter Carriers, but not even mentioned by the majority opinion,
should be the controlling precedent on the issue of federal preemp-
tion in a labor dispute setting.85 The dissent likened the defend-
ants' words to "physical blows ... foul-mouthed violence tanta-
mount to an assault [which] . .. [n]o free man or woman should
be expected to endure . . . without redress" because of their "pro-
pensity to invoke an immediate breach of the peace, which is no
trivial matter in light of the tendency of many of our citizens to
keep and bear arms."8 6 Since such a verbally abused person is not
permitted under the law to respond with physical violence," but,
rather, to pursue damages under the "fighting words" statute in
lieu of self help, the dissent criticized the court for destroying the
only available remedy for the plaintiffs. Finally, the dissent recal-
led that Garmon had salvaged from preemption those "state-court
actions to redress injuries caused by violence or threats of violence
[regarded as] consistent with effective administration of the fed-
eral scheme . . .[which] can be adjudicated without regard to the
merits of the underlying labor controversy. "88
The Crawford decision has been subject to sweeping criticism as
80. Id. at 837.
81. Id. at 838.
82. Id. at 839.
83. Id. at 842 (Russell, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 844 (Russell, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 842 (Russell, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 841 (Russell, J., dissenting).
87. Id., citing Roark v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 244, 252, 28 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1944).
88. Id. at 842-43, quoting from Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
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being "the luxury of justices who themselves never have to endure
crude obscenities or fear threatened violence as do those workers
who cross a picket line."' 89 If the majority viewpoint of Crawford is
shared by the United States Supreme Court,90 it is indeed difficult
to imagine a hypothetical where a state interest could survive any
defense of preemption in a labor dispute setting.
III. CONCLUSION
The resurrection of common law slander/libel and "fighting
words" rights of nonstrikers appears doubtful in those jurisdictions
which follow the Virginia court's stance that federal law preempts
any such state causes of action. Should other states adopt the dis-
senting view in Crawford, however, these rights of nonstrikers
might be redressed, section 8(c) of Taft-Hartley notwithstanding.
Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies the extent to
which federal labor legislation preempts state law in the area of
language abusive to nonstrikers, albeit language which is not physi-
cally threatening, there is no certainty as to whether any such
rights survive strikers' section 8(c) protection.
If nonstrikers are left with only the right to file unfair labor
practice charges because of the preemption doctrine, proving lan-
guage to be tantamount to coercion or restraint is difficult, at best.
Although the NLRB's former blanket protection for picket line
language absent accompanying violence has been significantly
qualified by Clear Pine Mouldings,91 words which are purely in-
sulting and not palpably threatening in nature apparently will con-
tinue to be privileged under section 8(c).
89. See Fighting Words, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 4, 1985, at A-14, col. 1-2.
90. The plaintiffs in Crawford have petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. Id.
91. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
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